This paper analyzes three-party negotiations in the presence of externalities, deriving a close form solution for the stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a standard non-cooperative bargaining model. Players' values are monotonically increasing (or decreasing) in the amount of negative (or positive) externalities that they impose on others. Moreover, players' values are continuous and piecewise linear on the worth of bilateral coalitions, and are inextricably related to their negotiation strategies: the equilibrium value is the Nash bargaining solution when no bilateral coalitions form; the Shapley value when all bilateral coalitions form; or the nucleolus, when either one bilateral coalition among 'natural partners' or two bilateral coalitions including a 'pivotal player' form.
Introduction
This paper studies multilateral negotiations in the presence of externalities.
These problems are important in economics, appearing in such diverse areas as mergers and acquisitions, bankruptcy and international treaty negotiations, as well as the formation of labor unions and coalitional governments.
What is the sequencing of negotiations and how do the parties involved form valuations? Our goal in this paper is to analyze a standard strategic model of negotiations and to derive a close form solution answering the question above.
While bilateral negotiations have been extensively studied, much less is known about the more complex problem of negotiations involving three or more parties, where, for example, coalition formation is an important aspect of the negotiations. We restrict our attention here to three-player games and develop an explicit solution for all three-player games with externalities.
Having a simple off-the-shelf solution for three-player games is helpful in extending our understanding one step beyond bilateral interactions, and is useful in applications where coalition formation and externalities play an important role.
The bargaining model analyzed herein is a standard non-cooperative model (see literature review below). Our main contribution is to characterize its stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. In our model there are three players who can form bilateral coalitions and the grand coalition. A set of parameters describe the worth of the grand coalition and of all bilateral coalitions, including the amount of externalities they impose on excluded players. The bargaining game evolves over time with players making offers followed by responses every period.
We show that the equilibrium value, referred to as the coalitional bargaining value (CBV), is a continuous and piecewise linear function of the parameters of the game. Specifically, the space of all games is divided into four convex regions (eight including all permutations), and in each region the CBV is a linear function of the parameters of the game. For three-player games without externalities, in one of the regions the CBV coincides with the Nash bargaining solution, in another region with the Shapley value, and in the other regions with the nucleolus. For three player games with externalities, a similar treatment applies as long as an adjusted measure for the worth of pairwise coalitions is used to generalize the Shapley value and the nucleolus. This adjustment involves measuring the worth of a pairwise coalition adding the amount of negative externalities (or subtracting the amount of positive externalities) that it creates for the excluded player.
Therefore, this paper proposes a way to select a specific cooperative solution concept for all three-player games without externalities, and a generalization to situations with externalities.
The strategies employed by players in each region have an intuitive economic interpretation in terms of credible outside options (see also Sutton (1986) ). This interpretation serves to enhance our understanding of the related cooperative solution concepts and shows how valuations are inextricably related to the equilibrium negotiation strategies. First, the CBV is equal to the Nash bargaining solution (equal split of the surplus) and no bilateral coalitions forms, if the (adjusted) worth of all bilateral coalition is less than a third of the grand coalition value. In this region no player is able to demand more than an equal share of surplus because the outside option of forming a bilateral coalition is not credible. Second, the CBV coincides with the (generalized) Shapley value and all bilateral coalitions can form in equilibrium, if the sum of the (adjusted) values of all bilateral coalitions is greater than the grand coalition value. In these games, there is an advantage from being the proposer (first mover advantage) and a disadvantage from being excluded from a bilateral coalition.
Finally, there are two novel cases in which the CBV coincides with the (generalized) nucleolus: games where only the 'natural coalition' among two 'natural partners' creates significant value, and games where only the two pairwise coalitions including a 'pivotal player' create significant value. In the first case, the player excluded from the natural coalition agrees with a payoff lower than an equal split of the surplus, and the natural partners equally split the gains from forming the natural coalition-an outcome that is driven by the fact that only the natural coalition can credibly form in equilibrium. In the second case, both non-pivotal players agree to form a coalition with the pivotal player, receiving a payoff lower than an equal split of the surplus-an outcome that is driven by the fact that only the pairwise coalitions including the pivotal player can credibly form.
There is now an extensive literature studying non-cooperative coalitional bargaining games-we refer below to the most closely related literature. Earlier papers in the area analyzed the properties of games without externalities: Gul (1989) , Chatterjee et al. (1993) , Moldovanu and Winter (1995) , Okada (1996) , Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) , Krishna and Serrano (1996) , Seidmann and Winter (1998), among others. Later studies considered the extension to coalitional bargaining games with externalities. For example, Jehiel and Moldovanu (1995ab), Bloch (1996) , Yi (1997) , Ray and Vohra (1999) , Montero (1999) , and Gomes (2001) showed that a much broader range of applications can be analyzed when allowing for externalities. Moreover, they addressed several general properties (such as efficiency, bargaining delays, existence, stability, uniqueness, and convergence) of the equilibrium for games with an arbitrary number of players.
Similarly to Moldovanu (1990) , Serrano (1993) , and Cornet (2003) , the contribution of this paper to the literature is its in depth analysis of 3-player games. Moldovanu (1990) studies the coalition-proof Nash equilibria of 3-player games without side payments. Among other properties, he shows that if the game is balanced then the equilibrium payoff is in the core. Serrano (1993) studies 3-player bargaining games without externalities in which responders may exit an have endogenous outside options. When the order of proposers corresponds to the power players have in the underlying coalition function, the unique Markov perfect equilibrium outcome of the game is the prenucleolus. Cornet (2003) studies 3-player negotiations with externalities using a model in which bargaining takes place using the demand-making framework originally proposed by Binmore (1985) . In this framework players sequentially pose demands and accept or reject standing demands from other player(s). In Cornet's framework acceptance leads to the formation of a two (or three) player coalition and the game terminates, while in our framework the game goes on even when a two-player coalition has already been formed. Cornet (2003) analyzes the (stationary) subgame perfect equilibrium and shows that it is not unique and may be inefficient. His main conclusion is that creation of positive or negative externalities by a coalition is irrelevant to the equilibrium value. The properties of our solution are different because we show that the players' values are increasing (decreasing) on the amount of negative (positive) externality that they can impose on others. 
The Bargaining Model
The game has three players N = {1, 2, 3}. Each player owns an indivisible tradeable resource or right, and they can buy or sell resources in exchange of a transfer of utility. Players that acquire resources continue trading, and players that sell their resources leave the game. Our notion of equilibrium is stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium or Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE). A strategy profile σ is MPE if it is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and the strategies are Markovian, i.e., the strategies at each stage of the game do not depend on the history of the game nor on calendar time. Formally, at the proposal stage a Markovian strategy depends only on the current c.s. and who is the proposer; at the response stage a Markovian strategy depends only on the current c.s., the proposer, the offer made by the proposer, and (if a player is the second responding) the response of the first responder.
The Coalition Bargaining Value
The interesting action happens at the initial stage. After any bilateral agreement, the analysis reduces to a standard two-player bargaining game. It is a well-known result that the random proposer bilateral bargaining game has a unique (stationary) subgame perfect equilibrium (this game is an unessential variation of Rubinstein's (1982) alternating offer bargaining game). In the unique equilibrium, the continuation values of the bilateral game with c.s.
[ij|k] are equal to
respectively, for coalition ij and player k. Note that this is the value at the subgame [ij|k] before the proposer has been chosen. It is also useful to define the continuation values at the end of subgame [ij|k], after offers have been rejected, which are equal to
Consider any MPE σ and let v i be the equilibrium continuation value of player i when the c.s. is [1|2|3], before the proposer has been chosen. Any player responding to an offer can, by rejecting it, maintain the negotiations on the same state. Therefore, when faced with any offer, responders accept it only if the offer price is above or equal to v δ i := δv i . On the other hand, proposers choose whom to extend an offer to based on which deal produces the largest gains-always offering the minimum prices that are acceptable. Specifically, say that player i's strategy puts probability σ δ i (S) on making an offer to form coalition S (where i ∈ S ), and let the gain associated with the formation of coalition S be e δ S , which is equal to
and zero if S = {i} (no coalition forms). Note that this implies that in equilibrium coalition S forms with probability μ δ S = P i∈N p i σ δ i (S). Also note that the value v i is endogenously given, and must be equal to
. This is because, when player i proposes, his value is v δ i + max i∈S⊂N e δ S , and when another player proposes, i's value is V δ i , if i is excluded from the offer, and v δ i otherwise. We obtain the equilibrium for all δ >δ, whereδ < 1, by constructing strategies σ δ i satisfying
and satisfying
We are particularly interested in the limit equilibrium value when δ converges to one (which corresponds to an arbitrarily small interval between offers). The limit equilibrium value is referred to as the coalition bargaining value (CBV) of the game.
Proposition 1 Consider any 0-normalized three-player game where the grand coalition is efficient (i.e., U ≥ 0 and U ≥ U ij + U k ) and the opportunities to propose satisfy
There exists a MPE σ δ for all δ >δ, whereδ < 1, such that:
Part A. The equilibrium values v δ i converge to v i (the coalition bargaining value) when δ converges to one:
Part B:
The following coalitions form in each of the cases above (μ δ S = P i∈N p i σ δ i (S) is the probability of coalition S forming):
In the proof (see appendix) we consider a partition of the parameter space into regions defined by the inequalities i, ii, iii, and iv. In each region, we compute the values v δ i and the strategies σ δ i satisfying the system of equations and inequalities (2)-(3). We then take the limit of the solution in each region and show that the limit satisfies part A and B of proposition 1 (explicit formulas for μ δ S 's are also provided in the appendix). 3 Note that each case above defines a convex region, and there are a total of eight regions when all permutations are included (three of types ii and iii). Moreover, all games belong to one of the eight regions and the (interior) of the regions are disjoint.
The sequencing of negotiations is different in each region. Intuitively, region i corresponds to the case where no pairwise coalitions create much value, so the threat of forming a pairwise coalition is not credible and would only benefit the excluded player (accordingly the strategies are such that μ δ ij = 0). Region ii corresponds to the case where {1, 2} is the only bilateral coalition that creates significant value and is the only one that should arise in equilibrium ( μ δ 13 = μ δ 23 = 0). In region iii only pairwise coalitions with player 1 create significant value, so they are the only ones that should arise in equilibrium (μ δ 23 = 0). In region iv, the sum of values created by pairwise coalitions surpass the grand coalition value, and the solution predicts that all pairwise coalitions arise, but not the grand coalition The close form solution exhibited in proposition 1 allows for the evaluation of comparative statics effects associated with changes in the coalitions' worth and in the proposers' probabilities. We discuss below how valuations are intrinsically linked to the negotiation strategies, and the intuition for the comparative statics effects.
In region i, the CBV is the split of the surplus according to players's opportunities to propose. The intuition behind this result is that the threat of any pair of players i and j to form coalition {i, j} is not credible because the most the coalition {i, j} can get by alienating player k is V ij , and V ij ≤ (p i +p j )U, which is the amount they can get by conforming to the equilibrium strategies. In other words, the ability of players to demand more than a proportional split of the surplus by threatening to form a pairwise coalition is an outside option that is not credible (see Sutton (1986) ). The CBV prediction has the following comparative statics implication in this region:
the expected outcome of players should be insensitive to local changes in the coalition's worth and is increasing in the proposer probability, as long as the conditions for belonging to region i are maintained.
In region iv, the strategy of proposer i is to choose a player randomly, say j, and offer him the value δv j to form the pairwise coalition {i, j}.
Conditional on player i been the proposer and making an offer to player j, the value of left out player k is equal to V k , which is smaller than v k because
(obtained after taking into account that V k = U − V ij ). Therefore in this region there is an advantage from being the proposer and a disadvantage from being excluded from a pairwise coalition.
The comparative statics with respect to the proposer probability yields a surprising result. Based on the discussion above one would expect that in region iv the value of a player would be increasing in his opportunity to propose, but this is not the case (note that the limit equilibrium values
are not a function of the proposer probabilities). The explanation comes from the analysis of the equilibrium strategies. In the appendix, we show that coalition jk forms in equilibrium with probability μ jk = p i (in the limit when δ → 1). Thus increases in player i proposer probability p i are offset by players j and k who are more likely to form coalition jk (and conditional on coalition jk forming, the value of player i is
It is interesting to note that in region iv, if there are no externalities, the value of players are exactly equal to Shapley value. Recall that the Shapley value is the concept Shapley (1953) derived from axioms, and, in particular, its value for 3-player games is equal to Sh i = 1 6 (2U − 2U jk + U ij + U ik ). Thus the Shapley value arises as the equilibrium in situations where players rush to form any pairwise coalitions and there are significant first mover advantages (see also Gul (1989) ). 5 In the next section, we further discuss the connection with cooperative solution as well as the results in regions ii and iii.
Further Properties of the Solution
A situation of special interest is the one in which all players have an equal opportunity to propose (i.e.,
The CBV in this case simplifies to the following expression.
Proposition 2 Consider any three-player game where all players have equal probability to propose, and let U ij = U ij − U k . The CBV is:
Case ii : If U 12 ≥ U 3 , 2U 13 + U 12 ≤ U, and 2U 23 + U 12 ≤ U then
Case iii : If U 12 + U 13 + U 23 ≤ U, 2U 13 + U 12 ≥ U, and 2U 12 + U 13 ≥ U then
Note that the CBV depends only on an adjusted measure U ij of the coalition's worth, where U ij = U ij − U k is the value that coalition {i, j} creates plus (minus) the amount of negative (positive) externalities that it creates for the excluded player k. Therefore, players' equilibrium values increase or decrease with the amount of negative or positive externalities they impose on others. Interestingly, any game with externalities has similar value and dynamics compared to a game without externalities (a characteristic function game) once coalitions' values are adjusted, U ij , to take externalities into account.
Examples
A better understanding of the negotiation strategies can be grasped by analyzing a few specific examples illustrating the cases previously discussed (in all examples we assume that players have equal opportunities to propose).
Example 1 Three firms compete in an industry in which there are the following merger gains:
What are the prices at which firms merge? Are there any natural merger partners in this industry? The bargaining value and strategies provide a direct answer to the questions above, as one can easily verify that this game belongs to region ii and thus the bargaining value is
where
In this situation, we only expect to see the bilateral merger between firms 1 and 2. On the contrary, say that firms 1 and 3 merge.
Their profitability increases by v L 1 , and there are still gains from further consolidation with firm 2. Firm 2 and conglomerate {1, 3} split the merger gains in a Nash bargaining way, each getting, respectively,
. Note that the value of the conglomerate {1, 3} is
Therefore, one can predict that firms 1 and 3 are not going to merge, and by the same reasoning, one can also rule out a merger between firms 2 and 3. 1 − v) . Interestingly, the threat of forming only one union to bargain for higher wages is not credible. The larger union can bargain for a total wage package equal to half of the surplus that it creates, which is equal to 
In this game player 1 is the seller, player 2 is the high valuation buyer, and player 3 is the low valuation buyer. Are the CBV predictions reasonable? Shouldn't we expect competition between the two buyers to drive the good's price to 1, as the core predicts?
By proposition 1 we have that the bargaining value is
The main reason why the seller can't extract the entire surplus from the buyers is that both buyers have the option of forming a cartel to bid for the good and then buy it at a very low price (0.5), rather than initiating a bidding war. The seller knows about that all too well, and, rather than auctioning the good, the seller prefers to negotiate an intermediate price (between 0.5 and 1) with one buyer, leaving the second buyer with nothing.
Because all agreements are binding after a deal is sealed (i.e., either a buyers' cartel is formed or the good is sold) there is no way for the excluded player to undo the deal by enticing one of the players with a slightly better offer.
Cooperative Solutions and the CBV
We now discuss the CBV's relationship with cooperative solution concepts.
The CBV is closely related to classic cooperative game theory solutions for characteristic function games (i.e., partition function games without externalities, where U ij = U ij ).
Our next result shows that the CBV in regions i, ii, and iii coincides with the nucleolus. We recall that the nucleolus is the concept introduced by Schmeidler (1969) , who proved that the nucleolus always exists and is a unique point belonging to the core of the game, whenever the core is non-empty. Kohlberg (1971) then showed that the nucleolus is a piecewise linear function of the characteristic function of the game, and Brune (1983) computed the nucleolus with its regions of linearity for three-person games (see appendix). We have seen in section 3 that the CBV coincides with the Shapley value in region iv. 8
Proposition 3
The CBV of any 0-normalized superadditive characteristic function game is the nucleolus, if U 12 + U 13 + U 23 ≤ U, or the Shapley value,
Note first that belonging to regions i, ii, or iii is indeed equivalent to the constraint U 12 + U 13 + U 23 ≤ U . Comparing the formula for the nucleolus derived by Brune (1983) with the formula for the CBV yields the above result (see appendix). While the nucleolus is a concept that is mathematically 8 It is also worth pointing out the relationship between the CBV and the core. It is straightforward that the core of a three-player superadditive characteristic function game is non-empty if and only if U 12 + U 13 + U 23 ≤ 2U. Therefore, we conclude that the Shapley value is the CBV of all games with an empty core (because whenever the core is empty the game belongs to region iv).
very attractive and simple, economists have had difficulties in developing a motivation for it. The strategies employed by players in region ii and iii, where the nucleolus arise, 9 have an intuitive economic interpretation in terms of credible outside options which we now discuss.
For games that satisfy the conditions of case ii, there exists a pair of players {i, j} (natural partners) that are willing to form a pairwise coalition.
According to proposition 2, the outcome of negotiations when i and j are natural partners is v k = V k and v i = v j = V ij 2 whenever case ii holds, which one can easily see is equivalent to For games that satisfy the conditions of case iii, a pivotal player is included in all pairwise coalitions that are proposed, and the pairwise coalition between the non-pivotal players is never proposed. According to proposition 2, the outcome of negotiations when player i is pivotal is v i = V − V j − V k , v j = V j , and v k = V k whenever case iii holds, which one can easily see is
The intuition for this result is that players j and k cannot demand a higher payoff than V j and V k from player i by threatening to form the coalition {j, k} , since they would be worse off pursuing this strategy ( V jk ≤ V j + V k ). Also, note that players j and k are not willing to accept any offer lower than V j and V k because they can guarantee this amount by credibly holding out. This is so because if j holds out then i would successfully bargain with k to form a coalition; 9 See section 3 for a discussion of the equilibrium in region i. We believe that the solution is economically intuitive and the experimental results of Croson, et al. (2004) indicate that it is an interesting candidate to be an off-the-shelf solution for applications, filling a gap in the literature. A natural (difficult) next step for future research is to derive close form solutions for games with an arbitrary number of players and externalities. Moreover, it would be interesting to establish links between the solution and existing or novel cooperative solution concepts (see for example Maskin (2003) ). The results in this paper suggest that any plausible solution concept that applies to all games is likely to be a piecewise linear function, and it would be important to explicitly indicate the negotiation strategies associated with each region of linearity.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: First note that cases i -iv form a partition of the parameter space: the union of cases i, ii, and iii is the half-space V 12 +V 13 +V 23 ≤ 2U (and so it follows that i, ii, and iii is a partition of the half-space) and case iv corresponds to the complementary half-space V 12 + V 13 + V 23 ≥ 2U.
Denote limits when δ converges to one without the superscript δ:
We consider below a partition of the parameter space into open regions defined by strict inequalities i, ii.a-b, iii.a-d (subdivisions of cases ii and iii in which the strategies are slightly different but the limit solutions turn out to be the same), and iv. Consider the analysis of each of the regions separately in the remainder of the proof, and assume momentarily that U > 0 and U − U ij + U k > 0 (strict superadditivity). 
Consider separately subregions ii.a and ii.b of region ii.
(There are a total of three symmetric cases): Whenever (ii.a) holds let σ i δ ({i, j}) = 1, σ j δ ({i, j}) = 1 and σ k δ (N ) = 1 (so μ N = p k and μ ij = p i + p j ), and v δ be the solution of the system of linear eqs. (3):
Eqs. (3) have only one solution for all δ (that can be obtained applying, for example, Cramer's rule) and this solution converges to v i = , a result that will be used repeatedly in the remainder of the proof. From the solution to the system of equations, e δ N = (1 − δ) (δ(p i + p j )(U − W ij ) + U ), and thus
The inequality above holds because it is equivalent to
(There are a total of three symmetric cases) ii.b strategy: players i and j randomize over the choices {i, j} and N, and player k chooses N (let the associated transition probability be μ δ ). The transition probability is such that μ , because player k's only choice is N, and k proposes with probability p k . Moreover, given any transition probability μ δ satisfying the conditions above, we can always find a strategy profile σ δ with associated transition probability μ δ . Let μ δ and v δ be a solution of the (non-linear) system of eqs. (3):
The system of equations excluding the third and last eqs. and the variables μ and
, and the restriction μ ij > 0, corresponds to, V ij > (p i + p j ) U, and both holds. Moreover, ineqs. (2) hold: (observe that lim δ→1 e δ = 0 and e δ ≥ 0 for δ < 1) e δ ≥ e δ ik holds, for δ close enough to one, because lim δ→1 e δ = 0 > lim δ→1 e
Consider the decomposition of case iii into four subcases iii.a-iii.d. Figure 1 illustrates each of the subcases (projected in the V 12 -V 13 space). Note that, as figure  3 illustrates, all four subcases have a common intersection point.
(there are a total of six symmetric cases corresponding to all permutations of the players). iii.a strategy: players 1 and 2 choose {1, 2} and player 3 chooses {1, 3}, and v δ 's are the (unique) solution of the system of linear eqs. (3)
The limit solution is v 1 = U − V 2 − V 3 , and v j = V j for j = 2, 3. Ineqs. (2) are e 
holds for δ ∈ [δ, 1), because p 1 + p 2 + p 3 = 1 and first inequality in iii.a, imply e 0 13 − e 
(there are six symmetric cases corresponding to all permutations of the players).
iii.b strategy: players 1 and 2 choose {1, 2}, and player 3 randomizes over the choice of {1, 3} or N . The transition prob. must satisfy μ δ N + μ δ 13 = p 3 , because player 3 is the only player choosing {1, 3} and N (and 3 is proposer with prob. p 3 ), and μ δ N ≥ 0 and μ δ 13 ≥ 0 (reciprocally, given any μ δ satisfying the restrictions above, a strategy profile with transition prob. equal to μ δ can be constructed). Let μ δ and v δ 's be a solution of the (non-linear) system of eqs. (3),
The system of equations excluding the second and last eqs. and the variables μ for all δ ∈ [δ, 1) for some δ < 1 close enough to one. As we have already argued (see iii.a), e δ 2 ≥ e δ 23 holds whenever V 12 + V 13 + V 23 < 2U.
(there are total of three such symmetric cases): all players randomize over the choices of {1, 2}, {1, 3} and N. The transition probabilities μ The system of four equations (eqs. 1, 4, 5, and 6 above) and four variables (v show that it is a solution for δ = 1. By the implicit function theorem (IFT) a solution of the system for all δ ∈ [δ, 1), for some δ < 1, is also guaranteed because the Jacobian evaluated at the solution point and δ = 1 (where the Jacobian is the natural one associated the system of the equations) is a nonsingular matrix. Thus the problem of finding solutions for δ in a neighborhood of δ = 1 satisfies all conditions of the IFT. 10 Moreover, for δ close enough to one, the solution also satisfies the inequalities such as μ δ 12 + μ δ 13 > p 1 (the inequality μ 12 + μ 13 = p 3 + p 2 > p 1 is strict because p 1 < 1 2 and p 1 + p 2 + p 3 = 1) and e δ > 0 (because e 1 = 1 3 (V 12 + V 13 + V 23 − 2U ) > 0 is strict). Ineq. (2) is e δ ≥ e δ N . Since lim δ→1 e δ N = 0 and lim δ→1 e δ > 0 we can guarantee that there exists δ < 1 such that e δ ≥ e δ N for all δ ∈ [δ, 1). Consider now any game in the frontier of any of the regions we considered above (i.e., assume that some of the strict inequalities are binding). Note that such game can be approximated by a sequence interior games. Because the results holds for all games in the interior, and the MPE correspondence is an upper hemi-continuous correspondence of the parameters of the game, it implies that the results also hold for all games in the frontier.
Q.E.D.
